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The paper reexamines the employer size-wage puzzle using NLSY79 data. The empirical 
results show that even for those who never receive any training from their employers, size-
wage premium still exists and is quantitatively important. Wage increases associated with 
receiving on-the-job training are less in large establishments than in small ones. In addition, 
there is no evidence that starting wages in large establishments are lower than in small 
establishments. Theories that explain the size-wage puzzle using training and other 
endogenous productivity differences are not consistent with these new findings. 
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1 Introduction 
Why do larger firms or establishments pay more for (observationally) equivalent workers 
than smaller firms? While many hypotheses have been explored, this remains one of the most 
puzzling questions in labor economics. Brown and Medoff (1989) and Troske (1999) carefully 
examined a comprehensive list of possible explanations, but concluded there still remains a large 
and significant unexplained employer size-wage premium.  
Although worker productivity heterogeneity has always been one of the leading 
explanations of the puzzle (Brown and Medoff, 1989, Troske, 1999, Gibson and Stillman, 2009), 
recent theories explicitly point to difference in human capital accumulated on the job between 
small and large firms or establishments as the possible cause (Troske, 1999, Oi and Idson, 1999, 
Zabojnik and Bernhardt, 2001). As human capital accumulations are endogenous to firm or 
establishment size, the fixed effects approach that is usually adopted in the literature is 
inadequate in controlling for unobserved productivity differences (Gibbons and Katz, 1992). 
Instead, one needs to directly study these differences, such as training workers received, using 
suitable data sets. 
This paper reexamines the issue of size-wage effect, using a unique data set, the National 
Longitudinal Study of Youth's 1979 Cohorts (NLSY79). NLSY79 contains very detailed on-the-
job training information and has been used extensively in research on return to training (Lynch, 
1992, Frazis and Loewenstein, 2005). Thus it is an ideal data set to use for the purpose of 
controlling for human capital accumulated on the job through training. As a longitudinal data set, 
NLSY79 also has very low rate of sample attrition, keeps track of complete working histories for 
workers since labor market entry, and provides measures of pre-market human capital such as 
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the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score. All of these features allow more precise 
control of worker heterogeneities than in many previous studies. 
The paper focuses on industries that display positive and significant size-wage premium. 
After further controlling of training status and individual and job level unobserved 
heterogeneities, I find a large and significant wage differential associated with establishment size 
even for those who do not receive any training. In addition, workers in large establishments 
receive a significantly lower return to training than equivalent workers in small establishments: 
wage return to training in establishments with at least 500 employees is at least 5% lower than in 
establishments with less than 500 employees. This finding is quite robust and the differences are 
always statistically significant.  
The presence and significance of size-wage premium for those who never receive training 
do  not support theories attributing the size-wage premium to on-the-job human capital 
accumulation differences. Observing the fact that large employers and their employees are more 
likely to invest in firm-specific human capital, Troske (1999) hypothesized that workers in large 
firms or establishments are paid more because they receive higher levels of firm-specific training 
(See also Hu, 2003). Similarly, Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001) developed a model in which 
corporate tournaments induce workers in large firms to accumulate more general human capital 
through training. As the two theories rely on differences in training received in large and small 
firms or establishments, they do not explain why size-wage premium still exists for those who 
never receive training on the job.  
In addition, the finding that return to training is lower in large establishments, is 
inconsistent with the productivity hypothesis proposed by Oi and Idson (1999).  Oi and Idson 
(1999) conjectured that workers in large firms (establishments) are more productive because the 
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production processes are organized differently in large and small firms (establishments). For 
example, workers in large establishments may have to work harder as production requires team 
work. However, if similar workers are more productive in large establishments than in small 
ones, then they should be even more so after receiving training, as training and firm productivity 
are complements (Bishop, 1997). In a competitive market, return to training should then be 
larger, not smaller in large establishments.  
To summarize, by controlling for training, this paper adds new empirical results to the 
literature on the employer size-wage effect. These results contradict implications from theories 
that try to rationalize the existence of size-wage premium in a perfectly competitive setting, by 
differences in training and other unobserved and possibly size-dependent worker heterogeneities. 
This suggests that one has to look beyond the competitive paradigm and consider monopsonistic 
labor market models (Bhaskar, Manning and To 2002, Manning, 2003), of which the on-the-job 
search model (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998) is the most prominent
1. Nevertheless, in light of the 
new empirical findings reported in this paper, these models have to be extended to consider 
explicitly human capital accumulated on the job.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 of this paper reviews the literature 
on employer size-wage effect and return to on-the-job training. Section 3 presents empirical 
results based on NLSY79. Section 4 discusses how these empirical results relate to competing 
theories of the size-wage premium. The paper concludes in section 5.  
2 Literature Review 
2.1  Employer-Size Wage Effect 
                                                 
1 Green, Machin and Manning (1996) empirically examined the explanatory power of the 
Burdett-Mortensen search model for the size-wage effect.  
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Moore (1911) first found that workers in large Italian textile mills earned more than their 
counterparts in smaller mills. This turned out to be quite a robust finding across different labor 
markets.  Lester (1967) reported that average hourly earnings in large establishments were 20-
25% above the average hourly earnings in small establishments in the same industry.  Using the 
May 1979 Current Population Survey (CPS) data, Mellow (1982) found that hourly earnings 
were positively related to both firm and establishment size even after controlling for worker 
characteristics.  Brown, Hamilton and Medoff (1990) also reported similar findings from the 
May 1983 CPS.  Hourly wages in firms with 500 or more employees were 35% above those in 
firms with less than 25 workers. The size-wage premium was of similar magnitude to the 36% 
male-female wage gap, and exceeded the 29% union-nonunion and the 14% white-black wage 
differences. 
Controlling for detailed worker characteristics or looking into narrowly defined 
occupational subgroups reduces the employer size-wage premium.  But the positively inclined 
size-wage profile remains (Personick and Barsky, 1982, Brown and Medoff, 1989).  Even after 
further control of unobserved worker characteristics, either by the fixed effects approach (Brown 
and Medoff, 1989), or using Heckman-type selection models (Idson and Feaster, 1990), the wage 
gains associated with working in a large firm or establishment remain statistically significant and 
practically large. Using longitudinal data from the Quality of Employment Survey (QES), Brown 
and Medoff (1989) reported that "if a typical worker went from an establishment with 
employment one standard deviation below average to an establishment with employment one 
standard deviation above average, the employee would enjoy a wage increase of 8-12 percent, 
about as large as the union-nonunion differential in these data.".  Using worker-establishment 
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matched data, Troske (1999) reported similar findings after controlling for both unobserved 
worker and establishment effects. 
The employer size-wage premium has been one of the most interesting but hard to explain 
differentials in the labor market. Brown and Medoff (1989) examined six potential explanations, 
but only found modest support for the worker heterogeneity hypotheses. The five other 
explanations considered are that large firms offer inferior working conditions; make greater use 
of high wages to forestall unionization; have stronger ability to pay high wages; face smaller 
pools of applicants relative to vacancies; or are less able to monitor their workers. In their 
conclusion, Brown and Medoff (1989) also hypothesized that the employer size-wage 
relationship may actually be a relationship between firm age and wage since large firms are 
usually old firms. They later found (Brown and Medoff, 2003) that the firm age-wage 
relationship is solely explained by observed worker characteristics (see also appendix A of Oi 
and Idson, 1999 for relevant discussions). 
Several recently proposed explanations attribute the observed size-wage premium to 
productivity differences between workers in large firms (establishments) and small ones that 
have not been controlled for adequately in previous empirical studies. Troske (1999), in his 
conclusion section, suggested that both large employers and their employees are more likely to 
invest in firm-specific human capital. Thus, workers in large firms or establishments are paid 
more because they receive higher levels of firm-specific training. Similarly, Zabojnik and 
Bernhardt (2001) developed a model in which corporate tournaments induce workers in large 
firms to accumulate more general human capital through training. The productivity hypothesis in 
Oi and Idson (1999) is also similar in spirit – workers in large firms (establishments) are more 
productive because the production processes are organized differently in large and small firms 
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(establishments). As productivity differences associated with size are endogenously determined, 
fixed effects approach is not adequate in resolving the issue. Rather, it is necessary to control for 
these differences, such as training workers received, directly, with suitable data sets. This has not 
been done in previous empirical studies yet, due to data limitations. 
2.2  Return to On-the-job Training 
Training is the most important channel through which workers accumulate human capital 
while working (Becker, 1964). Economists have been interested in the magnitude of return to 
training, i.e., the effect of training on workers’ wage rates, for both theoretical and policy reasons. 
Nevertheless, estimating return to training is an empirically difficult task. Unlike full time 
schooling, training happens after workers enter into the labor market, and is difficult to be 
measured accurately (See Barron, Berger and Black, 1997 for a discussion of informal training, 
for example). 
Earlier empirical studies on return to training include Mincer (1983, 1988), Brown (1983, 
1989), and Lillard and Tan (1992). However, all these studies are based on some proxies, not 
precise measurement of actual training workers received (Lynch, 1992). Thus, I only review later 
studies based on NLSY79
2. None of the studies, though, have examined whether returns to 
training differ for workers in different-sized firms or establishments. 
Lynch (1992) used the 1979-1986 waves of NLSY79 to study the impact of training (which 
was categorized as on-the-job training, off-the-job training and apprenticeships) on wages.   
Basically she specified a cross-sectional model.  She also considered the sample selection issue 
                                                 
2 Frazis and Loewenstein (2005) provide the most recent survey of empirical findings on on-the-
job training from the NLSY79. 
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using Heckman's two step estimator, although the adjustment parameter was not statistically 
significant.  She concluded that on-the-job training with the current employer significantly raises 
wages. 
Using later waves of NLSY79, Veum (1995) found that training duration has no effect on 
wage levels and growth.  However, the incidence of on-the-job training was positively related 
both to 1990 wage levels and to 1986-1990 wage growth. 
Frazis and Loewenstein (2005) included all waves of NLSY79 data up to 2000 in their 
recent study. They used the fixed effects approach and paid special attention to the functional 
form.  They found that the effect of training on wages is very large (several times the return to 
formal education), even after controlling for differences in wage growth, promotion, and 
measurement errors. This suggests that there might be substantial heterogeneities in returns to 
training, and the magnitude of wage increases associated with increases in training hours needs 
to be interpreted cautiously. Similar to Veum (1995), one does not lose much by including only  
training incidence (dummy) - even though Frazis and Loewenstein prefer the cubic root function 
form, using a single training dummy produces almost the same fit and median effect (see: Frazis 
and Loewenstein, 2005, Table 2, page 458).  
3 Empirical Results 
3.1 NLSY79 Data 
The empirical analyses in this paper are based on NLSY79 data. The respondents were 
interviewed annually from 1979 to 1994, and every two years since then. NLSY79 includes a 
nationally representative cross-sectional sample, a supplemental sample, and a military sample.  
In this paper, I restrict all analyses to the cross-sectional sample, and focus on the period 1986-
2000, as there were no establishment size (or firm size) information for the period of 1981-1985, 
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and some survey questions were restructured after 2000. To get a relatively homogenous group 
of individuals, I consider only white males that worked full time (defined as 35 hours work per 
week and above) at nonunion jobs.  Self-employed individuals are not included. 
NLSY79 provides detailed information about training workers received. Following Frazis 
and Loewenstein (2005) and other previous studies, this paper focuses on completed on-the-job 
training spells
3. In addition, I use a training dummy (training incidence) instead of actual training 
hours
4. There are three reasons for doing so. Firstly, training incidence contains much fewer 
measurement errors than training hours (Barron, Berger and Black, 1997). Secondly, similar to 
Veum (1995) and Frazis and Loewenstein (2005), the preliminary regressions also suggest that, 
after controlling for training incidence, hours of training is no longer statistically significant. 
Lastly, the object of interest here is more about the wage difference between those who receive 
training and those who do not, and how it varies with establishment size, rather than the 
incremental wage changes associated with additional training hours.  
                                                 
3 A training spell is defined as on-the-job if it is "company training (type=8)" during the 1979-
1986 surveys, "formal company training run by employer (type=8)" or "training programs at 
work not run by employer (type=9)" during the 1988-2000 surveys. The 1987 wave of NLSY79 
does not contain any training questions. Instead, training happened in the year 1987 were 
recorded in the 1988 survey.  
4 The 1988-2000 surveys record number of weeks of training and hours of training per week for 
each training spell. Thus I can calculate total training hours as the product of the two. However, 
for the period 1979-1986 only weekly training hours are recorded and we need to estimate total 
training hours. This is done by assuming that number of weeks is 4 per month during the whole 
training spell following Frazis and Loewenstein (2005). 
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The paper uses establishment size information, taken from the question "number of 
employees at location of current job" or "number of employees at location at respondent's job 
number 1", for all waves except the period of 1981-1985. Firm sizes were not available from the 
survey
5, but Brown and Medoff (1989) have shown that the partial effect of establishment size 
on wage is larger than the firm effect. I follow the literature and use 500 employees as the cutoff 
point to define establishments as either large or small. Nevertheless, main results from the paper 
are not changed when alternative cutoff points (250 and 100) or the natural log of establishment 
size are used
6. 
The analysis uses current job (or CPS job, job number 1) information for the period 1986-
2000. I first transform nominal hourly wages into real wages using CPI-U (1982-1984=100), 
then exclude values that are greater than $100 or less than $1. In most years the loss of sample 
size is less than 2%. For each current job hourly wage, the following information are recorded: 
year of tenure, total labor market experience, union status on the job, industry, occupation, part-
time status, establishment size, local unemployment rate, on-the-job training incidence and hours, 
and off-the-job training incidence and hours. Variables such as gender, race, education, marriage 
status, and AFQT score are also included. 
3.2 Preliminary Analyses  
The first empirical task is to use NLSY79 data to reproduce the size-wage effect observed 
in the previous literature without controlling for training. To start, I run OLS regressions on large 
establishment size dummy (500+) and other control variables for each industry separately. The 
                                                 
5 For workplaces within the firm, but other than where the employee is working from, NLSY79 
only asked for whether the number of employees is over or less than 1,000.  
6 Those results are not included in the paper but are available upon request from the author. 
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results, as reported in Table A1, show that size-wage effects vary substantially by industry
7. I 
then focus on industries that show a positive and significant size-wage premium, including 
manufacturing, transportation, communication and other public utilities, wholesale and retail 
trade, business and repair services, and public administration, which together accounts for 63% 
of the total sample. Other industries are used as a control later on when conducting the 
falsification tests. 
Sample summary statistics are given in Table 1. Note that the unit of observation is a 
person-year. The sample mean of natural log of hourly wage is 6.7, which corresponds to a real 
wage rate of $8 in 1982-84 dollar. In terms of education, 57% of the sample has a high school 
diploma or less, while 19% of the sample has at least a Bachelor's degree. On average, workers 
have 4.6 years of tenure with current employers and 11.5 years of total labor market experience. 
83% of the sample work in small establishments, while the rest work in large ones, where large 
establishments is defined as those with at least 500 employees. Average wage rate for large 
establishments is substantially higher. Those who work for large establishments earn $10.6 per 
hour on average, 38% higher than those in small establishments. On the other hand, workers in 
                                                 
7 See also Oi and Idson (1999). Another source of information is provided by U.S. Small 
Business Administration (SBA) which suggests that average per employee payroll does not 
always increase with firm or establishment size even when no controls are included (see: 
http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/data.html). Similarly, Gibson and Stillman (2009) report that 




    
large establishments also tend to be more productive, with more years of schooling, higher 
AFQT scores, longer tenure with current employers and more on-the-job and off-the-job training. 
The following ordinary least squares (OLS) model controls for observable characteristics 
that affect productivities and wages:  
_ it it it it LNW L EST x γ βε ′ =+ +  
(1)
In model (1), i  stands for worker and t  stands for year. LNW  is the log hourly wage, 
  is a dummy variable for large establishment,  _ LE S T x   is the vector of other explanatory 
variables, including AFQT, schooling dummies, marriage dummies, regional dummies, local 
unemployment rate, tenure with current job, total labor market experience, and industry 
dummies. 
Model (2) is a panel data model with (unobserved) person effects, 
_ it it it i it LNW L EST x γ βφε ′ =+ + +   (2)
where φ  is the unobserved person effects (indexed only by i) that do not change for a given 
worker. The model is estimated using both random effects and fixed effects approaches. 
Table 2 reports estimation results. We see that as usual, more schooling is associated with 
higher earnings. AFQT, tenure and labor market experience are all positively related to hourly 
wage rate, while workers in areas of high unemployment are paid less.  Based on the OLS result, 
workers in large establishments earn 13.3% more than those in small ones. When person effects 
are controlled, the estimated coefficient is reduced to 7.2% in the random effects specification, 
and to 5.4% in the fixed effects specification. Nevertheless, they are all statistically significant at 
1% level.  Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that even though a substantial proportion of the size-
wage effect is due to worker heterogeneity, the remaining part is still practically important and 
statistically significant (Brown and Medoff, 1989). 
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3.3  Main Results 
I now consider model (3) which formally introduces on-the-job training into the wage 
equation and allows for different returns to training in different-sized establishments.   
_ it it it it it it LNW TR L EST TRL x α γθ β ε ′ =+ + + +   (3)
1 TR =  if the person has finished at least one on-the-job training spell on the current job by 
year  ,    if not.  TRL   is the interaction term of TR with  . The parameter of 
primary interest here is 
t 0 TR = _ LE S T
θ , and we are interested in testing whether returns to training differ for 
different sized establishments. 
The first column of Table 3 gives the OLS results.  The coefficient on   is 14%, 
which is close to that in model (1), but now represents the wage difference between untrained 
workers in large and small establishments.  Return to training is 8.2% in small establishments, 
while only 2.9% in large establishments.  The coefficient of TRL   equals -5.1% and is 
statistically significant at 5% level. 
EST L _
One could argue that unobserved worker heterogeneity would bias estimates from the OLS 
specification. Suppose that the omitted person effect is positively related to whether a person is 
trained or not (TR), and whether a person is employed in a large establishment ( ), then the 
OLS estimates of 
_ LE S T
α  and γ  would be upward biased.  However, a priori whether the estimate of 
θ  is biased, or if biased, the direction of the bias is hard to know. Thus, I consider the following 
panel model formally:  
_ it it it it it i it LNW TR L EST TRL x α γθ β φ ε ′ =+ + + + +  
(4)
where φ  is the unobserved person effect. Model (4) is also estimated by both random and fixed 
effects approaches, with results given in columns two and three in Table 3, respectively. In both 
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cases, the coefficients on the large establishment dummy are substantially smaller than that in 
OLS.  Return to training in small establishments is 5.2% in the random effect specification and 
4.6% in the fixed effects specification, suggesting that workers are selected to training based on 
unobservable characteristics. Nevertheless, the difference between return to training for small 
and large establishments (θ ) becomes even larger, with point estimates at -6.6% and -7.5% in 
random and fixed effects specifications, respectively. Both are also statistically significant at the 
1% levels. This indicates that return to training is substantially lower in large establishments 
even after person effects are taken into account. 
The NLSY79 data also contains information regarding the starting and ending date of each 
job spell, which allows us to explicitly consider job-match effects that do not change during a job 
spell.  The model is as follows. 
(,) _ it it it it it i J i t it LNW TR L EST TRL x α γθ β φ η ε ′ =+ + + + + +  
(5)
In model (5), η  is the unobserved job-match effect, with   indexing the employer for 
person i at year t.  The idea is that when a worker and a firm is a good "match", the productivity 
level would be higher than otherwise. This is in addition to the person specific wage effect 
captured by 
) , ( t i J
φ . 
This model can be estimated in three different ways. The first is the usual random effects 
approach as in model (4).  In this case φ  is actually subsumed in η . The second is the fixed 
effects approach which uses only within job spell variations. However, results for the job level 
fixed effects estimation are not reported as within a job, variations in establishment size are 
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primarily due to measurement errors. The last one is a two-level mixed model, accounting for 
both φ  and η  in the variance-covariance matrix
8. 
Results are reported in the last two columns of Table 3.  The random effects results based 
on job match effects are not greatly different from those based on person effects as in model (4). 
Again, return to training is smaller in large establishments by 5% and this difference is 
statistically significant at 1% level. For the two-level mixed model, return to training is 3.3% in 
small establishments. The coefficient on the interaction term of training and establishment size is 
-5.4% and significant at the 1% level.  
It should also be pointed out that no single specification is clearly preferred to the rest. 
While the fixed effects estimator is consistent even if person or job-match effects are correlated 
with the explanatory variables, it uses only within variations and the measurement error problem 
can be quite severe. Nevertheless, in all specifications there is strong evidence that return to 
training is lower in large establishments. 
Finally, I run wage regressions for those who just started a new job (with at most 1 year job 
tenure) and have not received any on-the-job training. The results are reported in Table 4. Based 
on OLS and random effects specifications, those who work in large establishments still earn 
higher wages than those in small establishments, controlling for everything else. The coefficient 
for large establishment becomes small and insignificant in the fixed effects specification. Overall, 
                                                 
8 This approach is similar to the random effect specification, as error terms are still assumed to 
be orthogonal to explanatory variables. However, it allows for two levels (person and job spell) 
of unobserved effects. The model is estimated using XTMIXED in STATA. For more details, 
see Searle, Casella and McCulloch (1992). 
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it is safe to conclude that no evidence suggests those in large establishments earn lower starting 
wages than their counterparts in small establishments.  
3.4  Robustness Checks 
The empirical work conducted suggests that although size-wage premium exists for 
untrained workers, it does not seem to hold for trained workers. To put it differently, return to 
training is smaller in large establishments than in small establishments, with the difference 
quantitatively important and statistically significant. I consider several robustness checks in this 
subsection, with results reported in Table A2.  
Firstly, I include off-the-job training information in all analyses. Although the focus of this 
paper is on-the-job training, it makes sense to see whether adding off-the-job training 
information makes any substantive difference. Essentially all training spells that are not counted 
as on-the-job training are aggregated to this off-the-job training variable. We also allow tenure 
effects to be different in large and small establishments, to capture possible differential impacts 
of informal training that are not recorded in the data. The results are reported in panel A of Table 
A2.  Note that no substantive conclusions about on-the-job training reported previously are 
changed. The difference between return to on-the-job training in large establishments and small 
ones remain negative and statistically significant. On the other hand, wage return to off-the-job 
training is essentially zero once individual heterogeneity is controlled for. The interaction term of 
off-the-job training is also not significantly different from zero. In addition, note that the 
coefficients for large establishment remain large (above 7%) and highly significant in all 
specifications even though we control for all possibly differential impacts of formal and informal 
training. 
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Secondly, I consider the possible impacts of measurement error in establishment size, 
which might be particularly problematic for fixed effects specifications. Using UK data, 
Manning (2003) finds substantial measurement error about establishment size in self-reported 
employee data. However, as first differencing attenuates the magnitude of all coefficients, the 
difference in returns to training between small and large establishments would be even larger if 
there were no measurement errors
9. In panel B of Table A2, we exclude observations whose 
establishment size falls between 475 to 525 and run the same set of regressions. In doing so I  
avoid using size variations that are near the 500 cutoff point which could be mistaken due to 
misreporting. However, the results are essentially the same as those in Table 3.  
Next, the sample is restricted to the period of 1987-2000 and only employer-paid on-the-
job training spells are included. Training information is collected differently before and after 
1987
10. Also, NLSY79 allows us to identify who paid for on-the-job training in the 1987-2000 
surveys. During this period of time, on average, over 90% of all on-the-job training spells are 
paid by employers (calculated based on person-year observations), and large establishments paid 
a higher percentage of on-the-job training spells than smaller ones did. It is plausible that on-the-
                                                 
9 Barron, Berger and Black (1997) suggest that measurement errors in training variables are 
unrelated to establishment size. 
10 Despite its richness, training information has not been collected consistently in NLSY79 over 
time. The 1979-1986 surveys records only up to three formal training spells enrolled since last 
interview and up to two training spells that was still ongoing at last interview.  This was followed 
by a year of absence of training information in 1987. In the 1988-2002 surveys, up to four 
current and three previous training spells are recorded.  Supplemental questions, such as who 
paid for the training and the usefulness of training programs, were only asked in the latter period. 
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job training sessions paid and not paid by employers might have different contents and effects on 
wages
11. In fact, Holtmann and Idson (1991) suggest that workers in large firms are paid more 
because they are more likely to receive employer-paid training, which implies that their starting 
wages are lower but subsequent wage profiles are steeper. Our results as shown in Panel C of 
Table A2 suggest that controlling for difference in proportions of employer-paid on-the-job 
training does not change the main findings. 
Lastly, to make sure that our results are not driven by inexperienced workers who might 
have different levels of attachments to large and small establishments, I restrict the analyses to 
those with at least 5 years’ labor market experience. Once again, results in panel D of Table A2 
show no substantive changes from the main results.  
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that explicitly reports that return to 
training is smaller in larger establishments. There are findings that are closely related, though. 
Barron, Black and Loewenstein (1987) found that wage growth is smaller in large firms than in 
small firms
12.  Brown and Medoff (1989, p.1037) also noted that "A striking regularity among 
the professional, technical, and managerial workers is the tendency for the wage differential to 
decline with increasing skill levels". 
3.5 Falsification Tests 
Despite the robustness checks reported above, it is still possible to come up with stories 
that attribute the lower return to training in large establishments to imperfect control of certain 
                                                 
11 It is also likely that some of the on-the-job training spells are misclassified. Focusing on only 
employer-paid on-the-job training thus mitigates possible impacts from misclassifications.  
12 Results in this paper suggest that when training is explicitly considered, tenure effects do not 
differ for small and large establishments. 
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unobserved factors due to data limitations. For example, if NLSY79 captures less (relatively 
more formal) training spells in small establishments than in large ones, estimated wage return to 
training in small establishments could be upward biased.  
Therefore, a useful exercise would be to examine what happens in industries that do not 
show positive size-wage effects which were excluded in earlier analyses. Those industries 
include agriculture, forestry and fisheries; mining; construction; finance, insurance and real 
estate; personal services; entertainment and recreation services; education and other professional 
services. Table A3 presents results for wage regressions without controlling for training, similar 
to Table 2. The coefficient on large establishment size is almost zero in the OLS specification, 
but becomes negative and significant in random effects and fixed effects specifications. Based on 
the fixed effects model, individuals working in large establishments earn 6.2% lower than their 
counterparts in small establishments.  
Table A4 show the results when on-the-job training information is controlled for. Note that 
the interaction term of large establishment and training are always positive, although in some 
specifications not significantly different from zero in a statistical sense. In another word, the 
results suggest that for those industries that do not exhibit size-wage premium, there is also no 
evidence that return to training is lower in large establishments. Therefore, positive size-wage 
premium and lower return to training in large establishments go together. Theories try to explain 
one have to confront the other as well. 
4 Discussions  
This section examines the validity of several potential explanations of the size-wage 
premium, given the newly reported empirical findings. Hypotheses considered and rejected in 
Brown and Medoff (1989) and Troske (1999) will not be considered here further. 
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The first explanation to consider is the firm-specific training explanation given by Troske 
(1999). After examining and refuting a number of popular explanations for the size-wage effect, 
Troske (1999) offered his own: large firms not only hire more skilled workers, they also 
"produce" more skilled workers by giving them more specific training. Hu (2003) studied the 
hiring decisions of large firms and also hypothesized that firm-specific human capital might 
explain the size-wage effect. She also noted that testing this hypothesis directly is very hard, as 
data on firm-specific human capital investment and productivity is typically unavailable. The 
theoretic underpinning of this argument is Becker's original analysis of firm-specific training. In 
Becker's analysis, workers and firms share the costs and benefits of specific training.  If workers 
in large firms receive more training, then starting wages of these workers would be lower but the 
subsequent wage growth would be higher. Therefore, for workers who have not received any 
training, one would observe that those in large establishments to be paid the same as (or even 
lower than) their counterparts in small establishments. Our empirical results, however, show the 
opposite to be true.   
I then consider the hypothesis of general training proposed by Zabojnik and Bernhardt 
(2001). They developed a model in which incentives for workers to accumulate general human 
capital are provided by corporate tournaments.  Due to differences in corporate structures and 
prize sizes, workers in large firms are induced to accumulate more general human capital and are 
thus paid more. Their argument is similar to the specific training one and it does not imply a 
size-wage premium for workers who do not receive any training, which is contrary to what this 
paper found. Their theory also sheds no light on why return to on-the-job training would be 
lower in large establishments. 
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Finally, I consider the productivity hypothesis proposed by Oi and Idson (1999). They 
claim that workers in large firms or establishments are paid more simply because they are more 
productive. For example, workers in large firms are required to work in teams, they work harder, 
use more capital, face a higher customer arrival rate, or have received more training. The central 
idea is that the production process in large and small firms are organized differently, so that 
similar workers might have different levels of productivity. This theory is consistent with the 
observed size-wage premium.  It is also different from a simple selection story that could in 
principal be refuted by controlling for constant person effects using longitudinal data sets, as 
productivity differences are endogenous. Although one can never control for productivity 
differences perfectly, productivity hypothesis alone cannot explain why return to training is 
lower in large establishments. As training and worker productivity are complements, other things 
equal, one would expect that productivity increases for workers in large firms to be bigger. This 
has been confirmed empirically by Bishop (1997), who reported that increases in productivity are 
bigger for workers who receive training in larger establishments
13. In a competitive setting this 
would translate into higher wage increases for trained workers in large establishments, not vice 
versa.  
Therefore, the empirical findings in this paper suggest that one cannot easily rationalize the 
existence of size-wage premium in a competitive setting, using differences in training and other 
unobserved and possibly size-dependent worker heterogeneities. One has to look beyond the 
perfect competition paradigm and consider monopsonistic competition models that explicitly 
                                                 
13 The complementarity between training and worker productivity is also demonstrated by the 
empirical finding that firms usually select better workers to receive on-the-job training (Lynch, 
1992, Lillard and Tan, 1992).  
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incorporate labor market frictions. For example, the analysis in Green, Machin and Manning 
(1996) about the difference in size-wage premiums in union and non-union jobs actually bears 
some resemblance to the difference in size-wage premiums for trained and untrained workers. If 
one assumes that employers always pay less than marginal productivity, then wage distributions 
of trained workers would be more compressed and the size-wage premium would be accordingly 
smaller.  
Nevertheless, so far, monopsonistic competition models have not provided a direct answer 
to what would happen to return to training in different sized firms or establishments. For 
example, Quercioli (2005) extended the Burdett-Mortensen model by allowing firms to provide 
specific on-the-job training. But in her model, the equilibrium is characterized by all workers in 
the same firm receiving the same amount of training.  Thus it is impossible to compare wages for 
workers with and without training. Similarly, Fox (2009) uses a hierarchical matching model to 
interpret the finding that size-wage premiums are higher for white-collar workers with more 
responsibility. But as he admitted in his paper, the model does not provide an explanation as to 
why size-wage premium exists even for blue-collar workers.  
5 Conclusions 
This paper presents three novel and robust empirical findings based on NLSY79 data. First, 
the employer size-wage effect exists even for those who never receive any training. Second, 
return to training is lower for workers in large establishments than in smaller ones. Last, starting 
wages in large establishments are not lower than in smaller establishments. 
These empirical results dispute certain explanations of the size-wage puzzle, including the 
productivity hypothesis by Oi and Idson (1999), firm-specific training explanation by Troske 
(1999), and general training theory by Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001). All these explanations 
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attribute the wage premium associated with employer size to unobserved and endogenous 
productivity differences, including differences in training workers receive from their employers. 
Monopsonistic competition models of labor market that build on labor market frictions, 
such as the random search model (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998, Green, Machin and Manning, 
1996) and the matching models (Shi, 2002, Fox, 2009) may hold more promise toward 
understanding the puzzle. However, in light of our new empirical findings, these models have to 
be extended to consider the case of human capital accumulation on the job. Future research 
should also identify the relative contributions of different kinds of frictions to employer’s 
monopsonistic powers in the actual labor market.  
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Table 1: Sample Means and Standard Deviations. 
 
   
Whole Sample  Large Establishments 
(500+)  Small Establishments 
Log wage  6.70 (0.51)  6.97 (0.47)  6.65 (0.51) 
Education      
 - Less than 12 years  0.11  0.07  0.11 
 - 12 years  0.46  0.36  0.48 
 - 13-15 years  0.24  0.22  0.25 
 - 16 years  0.16  0.28  0.14 
 - more than 16 years  0.03  0.07  0.02 
AFQT  56.01 (27.31)  64.24 (27.99)  54.3 (26.86) 
Local Unemployment Rate  2.64 (0.90)  2.49 (0.79)  2.67 (0.91) 
Job Tenure  4.62 (4.67)  5.62 (4.91)  4.42 (4.59) 
Labor Market Experience  11.54 (4.72)  11.95 (4.91)  11.46 (4.67) 
On-the-job Training       
 - Incidence (dummy)  0.2  0.36  0.16 
 - duration (hours)  29.79 (179.01)  63.8 (234.72)  22.81 (164.42) 
Off-the-job Training       
 - Incidence (dummy)  0.14  0.19  0.13 
 - duration (hours)  21.88 (150.80)  37.22 (222.74)  18.71 (130.93) 
Establishment size >= 500  0.17  -  - 
 
Note: Total number of observations is 9,314. Standard deviations are given in parentheses when the variable is 
not a dummy. 
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Table 2: Wage Regressions Not Controlling for Training 
 





Large Establishments (500+)  0.133***   0.072***   0.054***  
 (0.010)  (0.010) (0.013) 
Education     
 - Less than 12 years  -0.072***   -0.063**    NA 
  (0.014) (0.028)  
 - 13-15 years  0.141***   0.134***    NA 
  (0.012) (0.023)  
 - 16 years  0.272 ***  0.303***   NA 
   (0.015)   (0.030)   
 - more than 16 years  0.345***  0.400***   NA 
   (0.029)   (0.050)   
AFQT  0.002***   0.002***    NA 
  (0.0002) (0.0004)  
Local Unemployment Rate  -0.030***  -0.029***   -0.028***  
   (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Job  Tenure  0.036*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 
   (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003) 
Job Tenure Squared  -0.001***   -0.002***   -0.002***  
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Labor Market Experience  0.033***   0.041***   0.044***  
 (0.004)  (0.004) (0.006) 
Labor Market Experience Squared  -0.0004**   -0.0006***   -0.0007***  
    (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
 
Note: Dependent variable is log wage. Number of observations is 9,314. The other explanatory variables are 
regional dummies, marriage dummies, and industry dummies. The base group workers are full-time white 
males with 12 years of schooling, work in a small-sized establishment. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *** stands for significance at 1% level, ** stands for significance at 5% level, * stands for 
significance at 10% level. 
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Table 3: Wage Regressions Controlling for Training. 
 












Large Establishments (500+)  0.140***   0.087***   0.072***   0.072***   0.058***  
 (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) 
On-the-job Training  0.082***   0.052***   0.046***   0.032***   0.033***  
 (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) 
Large Establishments (500+)  
x On-the-job training  -0.051**   -0.066***   -0.075***   -0.050***   -0.054***  
 (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.022) (0.019) (0.020) 
Education       
 - Less than 12 years  -0.068***   -0.062**    NA  -0.053***   -0.059**  
 (0.014)  (0.028)   (0.019)  (0.028) 
 - 13-15 years  0.137***   0.133***    NA  0.142***   0.131***  
 (0.012)  (0.023)   (0.017)  (0.021) 
 - 16 years  0.270 ***  0.302***   NA  0.327***  0.316*** 
   (0.015)   (0.030)     (0.023)   (0.028) 
 - more than 16 years  0.342***  0.400***   NA  0.432***  0.423*** 
   (0.029)   (0.050)     (0.043)   (0.052) 
AFQT  0.002***   0.002***    NA  0.002***   0.003***  
  (0.0002) (0.0004)   (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Local Unemployment Rate  -0.031***  -0.029***   -0.028***   -0.025***   -0.024***  
   (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Job  Tenure  0.033*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 
   (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.002) 
Job Tenure Squared  -0.001***   -0.002***   -0.002***   -0.002***   -0.001***  
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Labor Market Experience  0.032***   0.040***   0.044***   0.032***   0.036***  
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Labor Market Experience 
Squared  -0.0004**   -0.0006***   -0.0006***   -0.0003*   -0.0004*** 
    (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
 
Note: Dependent variable is log wage. Number of observations is 9,314. The other explanatory variables are 
regional dummies, marriage dummies, and industry dummies. The base group workers are full-time white 
males with 12 years of schooling, work in a small-sized establishment. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *** stands for significance at 1% level, ** stands for significance at 5% level, * stands for 
significance at 10% level. 
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Table 4: Wage Regressions for Starting Wages 
 






Large Establishments (500+)  0.059**  0.054**  0.016 
 (0.024)  (0.023) (0.033) 
Education     
 - Less than 12 years  -0.026 -0.043 NA 
  (0.024) (0.030)  
 - 13-15 years  0.083***  0.093***  NA 
  (0.024) (0.030)  
 - 16 years  0.283***  0.294***  NA 
  (0.037) (0.043)  
 - more than 16 years  0.428***  0.457***  NA 
  (0.076) (0.080)  
AFQT  0.001*** 0.001*** NA 
  (0.0004) (0.0005)  
Local Unemployment Rate  -0.046***  -0.042***  -0.038*** 
 (0.009)  (0.009) (0.013) 
Job Tenure  0.264**  0.216*  0.052 
 (0.120)  (0.113) (0.144) 
Job Tenure Squared  -0.151  -0.110  0.068 
 (0.115)  (0.109) (0.141) 
Labor Market Experience  0.037***  0.039***  0.048*** 
 (0.007)  (0.008) (0.013) 
Labor Market Experience Squared  -0.0005  -0.0005  -0.0006 
    (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
 
Note: Dependent variable is log wage. Number of observations is 2,287. The other explanatory variables are 
regional dummies, marriage dummies, and industry dummies. The base group workers are full-time white 
males with 12 years of schooling, work in a small-sized establishment, and with less than or equal to one year 
job tenure with current employer. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** stands for 




    
Table A1: OLS regressions of log wage on large establishment by industry 
 





R-squared Number  of 
observations 
Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Fisheries 
-0.110 (0.127)  0.31  559 
Mining 0.110  (0.147)  0.49  164 
Construction 0.540  (0.038)  0.24  1938 
Manufacturing 0.144***  (0.013)  0.50  3564 
Transportation, Communication, 
and Other Public Utilities 
0.107*** (0.031)  0.36  1087 
Wholesale Trade  0.258***  (0.054)  0.42  605 
Retail Trade  0.082**  (0.034)  0.31  2059 
Finance, Insurance and Real 
Estate 
0.019 (0.037)  0.50  855 
Business and Repair Services  0.124***  (0.039)  0.44  1385 
Personal services  0.868  (0.113)  0.37  246 
Entertainment and Recreation 
Services 
-0.020 (0.093)  0.38  249 
Health Services  -0.188***  (0.049)  0.45  447 
Education Services  0.070  (0.052)  0.32  424 
Other Professional Services  0.015  (0.051)  0.27  610 
Public Administration  0.128***  (0.029)  0.46  614 
 
Note: Dependent variable is log of wage. Other control variables are also included.  Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. *** stands for significance at 1% level, ** stands for significance at 5% level, * stands 
for significance at 10% level. 
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Table A2: Robustness Checks 
 
















A: Adding Off-the-job Training and Allow Tenure Effects to be different  
Large  Establishment  0.123*** 0.084*** 0.076*** 0.083*** 0.074*** 
  (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) 
On-the-job  Training  0.074*** 0.052*** 0.047*** 0.031**  0.033*** 
  (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0,012) (0.013) 
Large Establishment x On-the-job training  -0.050**  -0.069***  -0.073***  -0.047**  -0.054** 
  (0.021) (0.019) (0.023) (0.019) (0.022) 
Off-the-job Training  0.069***  0.003 -0.015  0.003 -0.005 
  (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.014) 
Large Establishment  x Off-the-job training  -0.082***  0.006 0.029 0.025 0.028 
    (0.025) (0.024) (0.029) (0.023) (0.026) 
B: Excluding Those with Establishment Size between 475 and 525 
Large  Establishment  0.134*** 0.082*** 0.067*** 0.072*** 0.067*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014) 
On-the-job  Training  0.082*** 0.052*** 0.046*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 
  (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) 
Large Establishment x On-the-job training  -0.045**  -0.061***  -0.072***  -0.048**  -0.051** 
    (0.022) (0.020) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022) 
C: Restricting to Post-1987 years and employer-paid on-the-job Training 
Large  Establishment  0.142*** 0.089*** 0.075*** 0.072*** 0.070*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) 
On-the-job  Training  0.079*** 0.047*** 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 
  (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) 
Large Establishment x On-the-job training  -0.054***  -0.073***  -0.083***  -0.052***  -0.058*** 
    (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) 
D: Restricting to those with at least 5 years' labor market experience 
Large  Establishment  0.146*** 0.090*** 0.074*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) 
On-the-job  Training  0.081*** 0.046*** 0.039*** 0.031**  0.029** 
  (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) 
Large Establishment x On-the-job training  -0.054***  -0.072***  -0.082***  -0.052***  -0.058*** 
    (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) 
 
Note: Same specifications as in Table 3. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** stands for 




    
 
Table A3: Wage Regressions Not Controlling for Training, for Industries with NO size-wage 
premium 
 




Large Establishments (500+)  0.007   - 0.038**   -0.062**  
 (0.018)  (0.019) (0.025) 
Education      
 - Less than 12 years  -0.037*   -0.034   NA 
 (0.021)  (0.035)   
 - 13-15 years   0.173***   0.188***    NA 
 (0.019)  (0.032)   
 - 16 years  0.259 ***  0.310***   NA 
   (0.023)   (0.039)   
 - more than 16 years  0.393***  0.435***   NA 
   (0.033)   (0.061)   
AFQT  0.002***   0.002***    NA 
 (0.0003)  (0.0005)   
Local Unemployment Rate   -0.021***  -0.016**  -0.014  
   (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.010) 
Job Tenure  0.031***  0.026***  0.022*** 
   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.005) 
Job Tenure Squared  -0.001***    -0.001***   -0.001***  
 (0.0003)  (0.0002)  (0.0003) 
Labor Market Experience  0.025***   0.040***   0.048***  
 (0.006)  (0.006) (0.009) 
Labor Market Experience Squared   -0.00003   -0.0005**  -0.0007** 
   (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0003) 
 
Note: Dependent variable is log wage. Number of observations is 5,546. The other explanatory variables are 
regional dummies, marriage dummies, and industry dummies. The base group workers are full-time white 
males with 12 years of schooling, work in a small-sized establishment. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *** stands for significance at 1% level, ** stands for significance at 5% level, * stands for 
significance at 10% level. 
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Table A4: Wage Regressions Controlling for Training, for Industries with NO size-wage 
premium 
 
















Large Establishment  -0.016   -0.045**   -0.063**   -0.033  - 0.042**  
 (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.028) (0.020) (0.020) 
On-the-job  Training  0.016 0.020    0.017 0.011 0.011 
 (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.029) (0.020) (0.023) 
Large Establishment x On-the-job 
training    0.087**   0.029  0.002  0.077**   0.061 
 (0.039)  (0.034)  (0.040) (0.031) (0.038) 
Education       
 - Less than 12 years  -0.037*   -0.034   NA  -0.049*   -0.041 
 (0.021)  (0.035)   (0.027)  (0.036) 
 - 13-15 years  0.172***   0.187***    NA   0.187***   0.185***  
 (0.019)  (0.032)   (0.026)  (0.031) 
 - 16 years  0.261 ***  0.306***   NA  0.288***   0.304*** 
   (0.023)   (0.039)     (0.033)   (0.040) 
 - more than 16 years  0.391***  0.434***   NA  0.458***  0.443*** 
   (0.033)   (0.061)     (0.048)   (0.054) 
AFQT  0.002***    0.002***    NA  0.002***   0.002***  
  (0.0003) (0.0005)   (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Local Unemployment Rate  -0.020***  -0.016**   -0.014  -0.022***   -0.019***  
   (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) 
Job  Tenure  0.029*** 0.025*** 0.021*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 
   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.005)   (0.004)   (0.004) 
Job Tenure Squared  -0.001***   -0.001***   -0.001***   -0.001***   -0.001***  
  (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Labor Market Experience  0.024***    0.040***   0.048***   0.027***   0.034***  
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) 
Labor Market Experience Squared  -0.00002   -0.0005**   -0.0007**    -0.0001   -0.0003 
    (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
 
Note: Dependent variable is log wage. Number of observations is 5,546. The other explanatory variables are 
regional dummies, marriage dummies, and industry dummies. The base group workers are full-time white 
males with 12 years of schooling, work in a small-sized establishment. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *** stands for significance at 1% level, ** stands for significance at 5% level, * stands for 
significance at 10% level. 
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